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NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS V. FINLEY: A DISPUTE OVER THE “DECENCY 
AND RESPECT” PROVISION 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Art is expression of ideas.1  People express their perceptions, ideas, feelings, and 
values through the arts and literature, thus they are entitled to First Amendment2 and 
Fifth Amendment3 protection.4  Since Congress incorporated the “decency and respect” 
provisions into the National Endowment for the Arts (the “NEA”) guidelines, the NEA 
                                                 
1 Michael Wingfield Walker, Artistic Freedom v. Censorship: The Aftermath of the NEA’s 
New Funding Restrictions, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 937, 955 (1993) (“The purpose of art is to hold a 
mirror up to society . . . our society loses something rare and precious every time we shut out 
even a single voice.”). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”  Id. 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Fifth Amendment provides: “No person shall be . . . deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”  Id. 
4 See generally C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 
UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1976) (“[s]peech is protected not as a means to a collective good but 
because of the value of speech conduct to the individual”); William J. Brennan, Jr., The 
Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 13 (1965) (“Literature and the arts . . . fall within the subjects of ‘governing importance’ that 
the First Amendment absolutely protects from abridgment.”). 
1
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has suffered intense scrutiny and criticism from the public.5 This provision has made 
the organization unstable, affecting the development of effective policies and goals.6   
 
There is substantial controversy over whether the government should be involved in 
art funding.7  The purpose of this Note is to present and critique arguments both 
supporting the “decency and respect” provision and those opposing it.  Those who 
support the clause state that although the people do not have a constitutional right to 
receive funding, the “decency and respect” provision does not violate the people’s First 
                                                 
5 Senator Gordon argued that “the state owes all things to all people and has neither the 
discretion nor the moral right to abstain from any facet of activity or to reject any petitioning 
for funds.” 135 Cong. Rec. S5805-0, 5806 (1989).  SECCA (Southeastern Center for 
Contemporary Arts) is an organization that granted $15,000 to Andres Serrano for “Piss 
Christ”.  Id.  In response, Senator Gordon also proposed that the NEA deprive SECCA of 
Federal funding for a period of five years and until the agency shows that it will be 
administered responsibly.  Id.; see generally Grace Glueck, Border Skirmish: Art and Politics, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1989, § 2, at 1 (reporting on tensions between artists and lawmakers); 
Kim Masters, Arts Panel Urges End to Grant Pledge, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1990, at G1 
(describing meeting of NEA Council on proposed pledge of compliance for grant recipients); 
Allan Parachini, Endowment, Congressmen Feud over Provocative Art, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 
1989, § 6, at 1 (explaining escalating political controversy involving the NEA); see also Daniel 
Mach, Note, The Bold and the Beautiful: Art, Public Spaces, and The First Amendment, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 429 (1997) (stating that “[t]he strict categorization that pervades public 
forum analysis is ill-suited to the complex and inherently ambiguous nature of art in public 
spaces.  Consequently, courts have created an inconsistent, result-oriented jurisprudence of 
public art”). 
6 Craig Alford Masback, Independence vs. Accountability: Correcting the Structural 
Defects in the National Endowment for the Arts, 10 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 177, 193-94 (1992) 
(“The Congressional shift toward a more conservative consensus [by incorporating the 
“decency and respect” provision in the Act] has undercut the bipartisan support for the arts 
that existed at the NEA’s creation”) (citing MARGARET WYSZOMIRSKI, Budgetary Politics and 
Legislative Support: The Arts in Congress, in CONGRESS AND THE ARTS: A PRECARIOUS 
ALLIANCE? 28 (1985)).  “Instead of working with Congress to develop art policies, the NEA 
has been in a largely defensive posture concerning its process and program, operating 
without a clear sense of purpose.”  Id. at 194.  Instead of allowing the NEA to independently 
create its own art policies, Congress has undermined the NEA by actually controlling its grant 
process and considerations.  Id. 
7 Michael J. Elston, Artists and Unconstitutional Conditions: The Big Bad Wolf Won’t 
Subsidize Little Red Riding Hood’s Indecent Art, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 327, 327 (1993) 
(stating that the controversy between artistic expression and government funding has placed 
the arts in a platform of political debate and has “focused attention to the ongoing debate 
over unconstitutional conditions”); Robert M. O’Neil, Artistic Freedom and Academic 
Freedom, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 189-91 (1990) (recognizing that the restrictions 
placed on funded art ists in the form of decency requirements have a ‘potential chilling effect’ 
on ‘bold and controversial works’ affecting both the artists themselves and the display 
industry of museums and galleries). 
2
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and Fifth Amendments.8  The provision is only a “consideration”, not a requirement.9  
Opponents of the “decency and respect” provision argue that the First and Fifth 
Amendments prohibit the government from controlling the content of the subsidized 
arts.10 
 
Part II of this Note provides a brief background on the establishment of the NEA.  
Part III is the Statement of the Case providing a brief statement of facts, procedural 
history, and the Supreme Court holding in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley.11 
 Part IV is the Analysis of this Note where Part A discusses the First Amendment 
provision regarding content-based and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech and 
unconstitutional conditions.12  Part B will deal with the Fifth Amendment and the 
dangers of overbreath and vagueness.13  Part C will discuss the possibilities of 
dissolving the NEA. 14  Part D will discuss different options the NEA has to achieve a 
compromise between its goals and the artistic views.15  This Note concludes that the 
                                                 
8 National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2179 (1998) (“Congress may 
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public 
interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the 
problem in another way”).  The Supreme Court overturned the lower court decisions and 
determined that because this provision is not “viewpoint” discrimination, it is not in violation 
of the First Amendment.  Id.  The Court also determined that the provision is not void for 
vagueness; thus, it  is not in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 2179-80; see also  J. 
Sarah Kim, Comment, Defending the Decency Clause in Finley v. Nat. Endowment for the 
Arts, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 627, 661 (1993) (stating that when Congress 
incorporated the decency clause, it was not attempting to “control the search for political 
truth” or to suppress dangerous ideas).  By the very nature of the arts, it is somewhat 
necessary to submerge into the content of such work to determine its “artistic merit.”  Id. at 
662. 
9 Kim, supra  note 8, at 662. 
10 James Kilpatrick, Editorial, No Indecency at Public Expense, STATE J.REG. 4, June 26, 
1998 (Springfield, IL), available in 1998 WL 14409729 quoting Finley:  
I feel this is a great loss to our country . . . I’m disappointed because I feel that a lot 
of people weren’t behind [the decency provision], like Clinton. He’s a democrat.  
[The NEA] strikes me as a very dubious idea, for one thing, to create a system of 
state-approved art.  Government has no business saying that this painting gets a 
seal of approval but this one does not. Such official patronage smacks more of 
Stalinist Russia than of a free America. 
Id. 
11 118 S. Ct. at 2168. 
12 See infra  notes 56-83 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra  notes 84-111 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra  notes 112-126 and accompanying text.. 
15 See infra  notes 127-149 and accompanying text. 
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NEA should not be dissolved but instead Congress should consider four alternative 
avenues in reaching a resolution between artists and the NEA. 16  
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
Congress created the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities 
(“Foundation”) to “develop and promote a broadly conceived national policy of support 
for the humanities and the arts in the United States.”17  The Foundation is composed of 
several organizations, including the NEA. 18   The Foundation vests in the NEA 
substantial discretion to award financial grants to support the arts.19  The purpose of 
                                                 
16 See infra  notes 150-159 and accompanying text. 
17 20 U.S.C. § 953(b) (1995) (“[T]he purpose of the [National] Foundation [on the arts] shall 
be to develop and promote a broadly conceived national policy of support for the humanities 
and the arts in the United States, and for institutions which preserve the cultural heritage of 
the United States pursuant to this subchapter.”). 
18 Id.; 20 U.S.C. § 953(a) (1995) (“[T]here is established a National Foundation on the Arts 
and the Humanities . . . which shall be composed of a National Endowment for the Arts, a 
National Endowment for the Humanities, a Federal Council on the Arts and the Humanities, 
and an Institute of Museum Services.”).   
19 20 U.S.C. § 954(c) (1995) provides the following: 
The Chairperson, with the advice of the National Council on the Arts, is authorized 
to establish and carry out a program of contracts with, or grants- in-aid or loans to, 
groups or, in appropriate cases, individuals of exceptional talent engaged in or 
concerned with the arts, for the purpose of enabling them to provide or support--  
(1) projects and productions which have substantial national or international artistic 
and cultural significance, giving emphasis to American creativity and cultural 
diversity and to the maintenance and encouragement of professional excellence;  (2) 
projects and productions, meeting professional standards or standards of 
authenticity or tradition, irrespective of origin, which are of significant merit and 
which, without such assistance, would otherwise be unavailable to our citizens for 
geographic or economic reasons;  (3) projects and productions that will encourage 
and assist artists and enable them to achieve wider distribution of their works, to 
work in residence at an educational or cultural institution, or to achieve standards of 
professional excellence;  (4) projects and productions which have substantial artistic 
and cultural significance and that reach, or reflect the culture of, a minority, inner 
city, rural, or tribal community;  (5) projects and productions that will encourage 
public knowledge, education, understanding, and appreciation of the arts;  (6) 
workshops that will encourage and develop the appreciation and enjoyment of the 
arts by our citizens;  (7) programs for the arts at the local level;  (8) projects that 
enhance managerial and organizational skills and capabilities;  (9) projects, 
productions, and workshops of the kinds described in paragraphs (1) through (8) 
through film, radio, video, and similar media, for  the purpose of broadening public 
access to the arts;  and  (10) other relevant projects, including surveys, research, 
planning, and publications relating to the purposes of this subsection. . . .  Any 
loans made by the Chairperson under this subsection shall be made in accordance 
4
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the NEA is to establish a “program of contracts, grants-in-aid, or loans to . . . 
individuals for projects and productions that are traditionally under-represented 
recipients of financial assistance.”20  The NEA’s mission is to encourage American 
creativity, cultural diversity, and professional excellence.21  However, in order to assist 
artists in achieving a wide distribution of their work, Congress imposed a requirement 
that such artwork foster the mutual respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the 
American society.22 
 
Within the National Endowment for the Arts, there is a National Council on the Arts 
(“Council”) which is composed of a Chairperson, three members of the House of 
Representatives, two senators, and fourteen members appointed by the President.23  
The members appointed by the President are individuals, publicly recognized for their 
knowledge and expertise in the arts, which equitably represent women, minorities, and 
persons with disabilities involved in the arts.24 
 
According to the administrative provisions, the Chairperson must utilize advisory 
panels to review the applications for projects, productions, and workshops.25  The 
advisory panel must base its decision solely upon artistic excellence and merit.26  Once 
                                                                                                                         
with terms and conditions approved by the Secretary of the Treasury.  In selecting 
individuals and groups of exceptional talent as recipients of financial assistance to 
be provided under this subsection, the Chairperson shall give particular regard to 
artists and artistic groups that have traditionally been underrepresented. 
20 U.S.C. § 954(c) (1995). 
20 Id. 
21 20 U.S.C. § 954(c)(1)-(3) (1995); see supra  note 17 and accompanying text. 
22 20 U.S.C. § 951(6) (1995) (indicating the importance of the arts among citizens while 
keeping in mind the different views and beliefs among all persons of the United States). 
23 20 U.S.C. § 955(a)-(b)(1)(c) (1995) (establishing that two members of the House of 
Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, one 
member of the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the 
House of Representatives, one Senator shall be appointed by the Majority Leader of the 
Senate, and one Senator shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the Senate). 
24 20 U.S.C. § 955(b) (1995) (“[The Council members are] private citizens of the United 
States who are widely recognized for their knowledge . . . [and] interest in the arts; and have 
established records of distinguished service, or achieved eminence in the arts; and . . . [The 
members represent] practicing artists, civic cultural leaders, members of the museum 
profession, and others who are professionally engaged in the arts; and . . . [who have a fair 
representation of various arts] fields and interested citizen groups.”). 
25 20 U.S.C. § 959(c) (1995) (establishing that the Chairperson shall issue regulations and 
establish procedures to ensure that the advisory panel is composed of individuals 
representing different geographic and ethnic backgrounds, minorities, and lay individuals 
with diverse artistic and cultural backgrounds).  
26 Id. 
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the Chairperson receives a recommendation from the advisory panel, the Chairperson 
must then make recommendations to the Council based upon both the advisory panel’s 
decision and the Chairperson’s own opinions.27  The Council then makes a final 
recommendation of whether to approve an application and the amount of financial 
assistance if the application is granted.28  Although the Chairperson retains the final 
authority to approve a grant application, the Chairperson cannot approve an application 
that the Council has rejected.29 
 
The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act (“Act”) requires the 
Chairperson to establish guidelines to evaluate the artistic merit, the artist’s talent, and to 
consider “general standards of decency.”30  The decency standard was set by Congress 
after the endowment gave money to controversial works such as the homoerotic 
images of Robert Mapplethorpe31 and Andres Serrano.32 
                                                 
27 Id. 
28 20 U.S.C. § 955(f) (1995) (“indicating that the Council must “advise the Chairperson with 
respect to policies, programs, and procedures for carrying out the Chairperson’s functions, 
duties, or responsibilities . . . , and review applications for financial assistance  . . .  and make 
recommendations for the approval and amount of financial assistance [if any] to provide to 
each applicant”). 
29 Id.  The Chairperson alone cannot reach a final determination as to whether to approve 
or disapprove an application until the Council gives the Chairperson its final recommendation 
on such application.  Id.  If the Council approves an application, the Chairperson may still 
reject the application.  Id.  If the Chairperson agrees and approves the application, he may 
only provide the applicant the amount of financial assistance recommended by Council.  Id.  If 
the Council rejects an application, the Chairperson has no authority to grant the application 
but may only affirm the Council’s decision.  Id. 
30 National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act § 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (1995); 
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 
Stat. 738 (1990).  Congress also enacted an amendment providing that no NEA funds:  
may be used to promote, disseminate, or produce materials which in the judgment of 
[the NEA] may be considered obscene, including but not limited to, depictions of 
sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of children, or individuals 
engaged in sex acts and which, when taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value. 
103 Stat. at 738-42. 
31 See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2172 (1998).  In Robert 
Mapplethorpe’s situation, the NEA granted him $30,000 for exhibiting his photographs of 
homoerotic scenes such as a man urinating into another’s mouth.  Id.; see also , 135 CONG. 
REC. 58762-01, 58809 (1989). 
32 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2172 (1998).  Serrano filled a bottle with his own urine and then placed a 
crucifix with Jesus Christ in the bottle and then took a picture of it.  Id.  For that the NEA gave 
Serrano $15,000 to honor him as an artist.  Id.; see also , 135 Cong. Rec. S5594-01 (daily ed. 
May 18, 1989) (statement of Sen. D’Amato) (stating that works of art such as Serrano’s 
should not be given support, especially, when the taxpayer’s money is being used to finance 
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 32 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss2/4
1999] NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS V. FINLEY 
 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
A.  Facts 
 
Karen Finley is a performer best known for a monologue in which she coated her 
bare breasts with chocolate, which looked like feces, to symbolize women’s 
oppression.33  She then proceeded to describe, using some profanity and several novel 
dance steps, an imagined sexual assault.34  In 1990, she applied to the NEA for a grant 
to subsidize her performance.35  The NEA’s Performance Artists Program Peer Review 
Panel reviewed a total of ninety applications, and recommended that eighteen 
applications be funded, including Finley’s.36  However, the Council recommended 
disapproval and, subsequently, NEA Chairman John E. Frohnmayer denied Finley’s 
application for funding.37  Finley subsequently brought suit against the NEA alleging a 
violation of her constitutional and statutory rights.38  Specifically, Finley sought a 
declaration that the decency and respect provisions of 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) were in 
violation of the First and Fifth Amendments.39   
 
                                                                                                                         
the works).  D’Amato further stated that “If [people] want free speech, [people] want to draw 
dirty pictures, [people] want to do anything you want, that is [their] business, but not with 
taxpayers’ money. . . . On what conceivable basis does anyone who would engage in such 
blasphemy and insensitivity toward the religious community deserve to be honored?”  Id. 
33 Mordecai Rosenfeld, A Bittersweet Controversy, N.Y.L. J., Sept. 2, 1998, at 2. 
34 Id.  
35 Finley v. Nat’l. Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1462 (C.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d, 
100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1997), rev’d, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id.  In June 1990, NEA Chairman John E. Frohnmayer polled members of the Council by 
individual telephone calls concerning the Performance Artists Program grants.  Id.  After 
receiving their denial, Finley, along with three other individuals whose applications were 
denied, filed this suit.  Id.  They asserted that the NEA and Frohnmayer violated their 
constitutional and statutory rights by improperly denying their applications for NEA funds 
and by releasing to the public information from their application forms.  Id. at 1460.  Indeed, 
the district court correctly found that the Chairperson violated the application process 
established by Congress to consider grants.  The Chairperson should not have approached 
each member individually but should have demanded all members meet and come to a joint 
resolution.  The Chairperson’s approach opened the door to possibilities of coercion and bias 
votes from the members.  The NEA should have demanded the Chairperson and the 
committee members to reconsider the four individual applications and then vote.  However, 
because the NEA did not pursue this issue on appeal, it is rendered moot. 
39 Id. at 1460 (challenging section 954(d)(1) where “artistic excellence and artistic merit are 
the criteria by which applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards 
 of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public”). 
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B.  Procedural History 
 
The district court found that the decency clause violated the First Amendment on its 
face by unfairly precluding some forms of protected speech and that the clause was 
unpermissibly vague under the Fifth Amendment.40  The district court rejected the 
NEA’s argument that “decency” and “respect” were simply implicit and voluntary 
guidelines in funding decisions.41  Instead, the court stated that the clause represented 
explicit criteria to determine eligibility for the NEA grants and that an overbroad statute 
would restrict both protected and unprotected speech.42  The court held that while the 
government may constitutionally regulate “obscene” speech, the decency clause may 
repress “indecent” speech, a form of expression clearly immune from substantial 
governmental interference.43   
 
Finally, the court argued that in certain “protected” areas, such as public education 
funding, government grants “may not be used to suppress unpopular expression.”44  
Since both “academic expression and artistic expression reached the core of a 
democratic society’s cultural and political vitality,” the court found that, similar to 
education funding, art funding demanded education neutrality.45  The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s findings and ruled in Finley’s favor.46 
                                                 
40 Id. at 1468, 1471. 
41 Finley v. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1471 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (“Had 
Congress believed that ‘decency’ and ‘respect for diverse views’ were naturally embedded in 
the concept of ‘artistic merit,’ there would be no need to elaborate on the [artistic merit] 
standard”), aff’d, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1997), rev’d, 118 S. 
Ct. 2168 (1998).  
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1472; see, e.g., Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) 
(“[E]xpression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment . . . .”); 
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978) (“Prurient appeal is an element of the 
obscene, but the normal definition of ‘indecent’ merely refers to nonconformance with 
accepted standards of morality.”). 
44 Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1475; see, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199 (finding that 
since public universities operate in a “traditional sphere of free expression fundamental to the 
functioning of our society,” they are a protected class under the First Amendment). 
45 Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1473-74 (surveying the NEA’s legislative history and recognizing 
the high ideals and ethics embedded in the Act, the court found that “artistic expression 
served many of the societal values as scholarly expression in [the field of public education]”). 
 Also, the court found that since the NEA makes many of its grants in a university setting, 
artistic activity in the classroom deserves the same freedom as that given to other educational 
activities.  Id. 
46 Id. at 1468, 1471; Finley v. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 680-83 (9th Cir. 
1996) (finding that the decency clause failed to notify applicants adequately of what is 
required of them because “persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the 
meaning and differ as to the application” of the decency clause).  The court stated that 
8
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C.  Supreme Court Holding 
 
The Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals decision, finding that the 
decency clause does not inherently interfere with the First Amendment right to free 
expression and it does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s void for vagueness 
provision.47  The Court found that 20 U. S.C. § 954(d)(1) merely adds “considerations,” 
or factors, to the grant-making process. 48  It does not state that all grants should be 
denied to applications involving “indecent” or “disrespectful” artworks.49  Although the 
statute does not state how much weight the Advisory Commission Council or 
Chairperson should give to these factors, the NEA has wide discretion in considering 
this provision.50  
 
Furthermore, the Court stated that in order to succeed, Finley carried the burden of 
demonstrating that there is “a substantial risk that the application of [the decency 
clause] will lead to the suppression of speech.”51  However, the Court found that the 
provision on its face was very clear in that the “decency and respect” provision is only 
a consideration,52 it is not a provision that compels the Chairperson to require “decency 
and respect” in every application.53  Because the very nature of the subject matter is 
                                                                                                                         
decency and respect are “contentless in the context of American society: the very nature of 
our pluralistic society is that there are an infinite number of values and beliefs and, 
correlatively, there may be no national ‘general standards of decency.’ ”  Id. at 680; see also 
George Vetter, Esq. & Christopher C. Roche, Esq., The First Amendment and The Artist – Part 
I, 44 R.I. B.J. 7, 17 (1996) (stating that although the NEA has not denied an application based 
upon the decency clause, critics believe that NEA is manipulating and channeling the 
decency clause through the “artistic excellence” requirement). 
47 National Endowment for the Arts, v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2172 (1998). 
48 Id. at 2175 (stating that the NEA implements the “decency and respect” provision by 
organizing an advisory panel which represents a wide variety of race and educational 
background, beliefs, and aesthetic views).  
49 Id. 
50 Id. (finding that the “decency and respect” criterion does not prohibit artists from 
expressing themselves).  It is a factor that the committee may consider when evaluating an 
application for a grant.  Id.  It is not a mandatory factor that the committee must consider.  Id. 
51 Id.  
52 Id. (finding that the “decency and respect” provision is viewpoint discrimination 
because “it rejects any artistic speech that either fails to respect mainstream values or offends 
standards of decency.”).  
53 Id. at 2177 (finding that the respect and decency provisions would not introduce “any 
greater element of selectivity than the determination on the basis of artistic excellence”).  The 
Court stated that they are not willing to start speculating as to possible cases where the 
decency and respect provisions would in fact threaten ideas.  Id.  Finley did not argue that 
the reason why their applications were denied was because they were in violation of the 
decency and respect provisions nor did they present any specific instances were the NEA 
9
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open to different interpretations, the Court determined that in the context of selected 
artistic subsidies it is not possible at all times for Congress to legislate with clarity54 and 
it is difficult to establish a precise criterion when granting subsidies.55   
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  The First Amendment 
 
“Above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to 
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”56 
 
1.  Content-Based and Viewpoint-Based Restrictions on Speech 
 
When the NEA determines whether to grant funding to an artwork based on artistic 
merit, it must consider how the subject matter, viewpoint, and mode of expression 
relate and harmonize with each other and to the effectiveness of the work of art.57   
Content is a broad concept that encompasses whole subjects of discussion regardless 
of the “viewpoint” expressed.58  A viewpoint may be defined as the way an individual 
perceives or observes the world around him.59  Also, subject matter may be defined as 
the thing that it is being represented, drawn, or painted in the work of art.60  Mode of 
expression is the means by which the artwork is expressed.61  
 
                                                                                                                         
denied an application based upon these provisions.  Id.  The Court stated that just as much it 
is conceded that different people interpret respect and decency in different ways, “artistic 
excellence” is also open to different interpretations.  Id. 
54 Id. at 2179 (recognizing that the artist may develop their artistic work taking into account 
the decision-making criteria from the NEA when funding works).  However, since “the 
government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the consequences of imprecision are 
not constitutionally severe.” Id. 
55 Id. at 2180 (stating that if the decency and respect provisions are unconstitutionally 
vague, “then so too are all government programs awarding scholarships and grants on the 
basis of subjective criteria such as excellence”). 
56 Police Dep’t. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
57 Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 795-96 (1st Cir. 1976) (“Funding 
decisions based on literary or artistic worth are unavoidably based in some part on . . . subject 
matter or content. . . .”). 
58 Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 101 (1996). 
59 Id. at 120 (stating that this is the most ambiguous and subjective element of expression). 
60 Amy Sabrin, Essay, Thinking about Content: Can it Play an Appropriate Role in 
Government Funding of the Arts? , 102 YALE L.J. 1209, 1219 (1993).  For instance, in Van 
Gogh’s painting “Sunflowers,” the subject matter is a vase filled with sunflowers.  In Oliver 
Twist, the subject matter is an orphan in nineteenth-century London.  Id.   
61 Id. (explaining that visual art work, for instance, may be represented through an oil paint, 
a sculpture, a water paint, or a photograph). 
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Finley argued that the “decency and respect” provision is viewpoint discrimination 
because it censors any artwork that does not fall within the “mainstream” of public 
moral values.62  Indeed, Justice O’Connor has stated that the “First Amendment 
prohibits content based restriction of speech unless the government can show that such 
regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest.”63  The Court 
found that by denying funds, the NEA is not prohibiting the artist from pursuing his 
work elsewhere, the denial is only in reference to a grant.64  Despite the fact that the 
decency criteria invites a subjective determination from the NEA, it does not seem to 
introduce a greater element of subjectivity than “artistic excellence” itself.65 
                                                 
62 National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2175 (1998). 
63 Simon and Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991). 
64 Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2177; see, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).  In FCC 
v. Pacifica Foundation, a monologue was broadcast over the radio about seven dirty words 
which “you definitely wouldn’t say ever” on the public airwaves.  Id. at 726.  A motorist 
complained to the FCC claiming that he heard the broadcast while driving with his young son. 
 Id. at 726.  The FCC concluded that the broadcast was “indecent” but not obscene.  Id. at 
726.  The FCC argued that it was not claiming that it could ban non-obscene language at all 
times.  Id. at 727.  Rather, it claimed that principles analogous to those of nuisance could be 
applied, making context all-important.  Id.  Thus, the FCC believed they could prohibit 
broadcasting this kind of language when children most probably would be listening.  Id. The 
Supreme Court found that even if it involves protected language under the First Amendment, 
the FCC had the right to take content into account and prohibit language where it is 
especially offensive.  Id. at 728.  Appellants in Broadrick v. Oklahoma , 413 U.S. 601, 617 
(1973), argued that the Oklahoma statute’s prohibition to actively participating in political 
activities would not only prohibit them from partisan political ideologies but will also limit 
their expressions and views when manifested ‘privately.’  However, the Court found 
illegitimacy in this argument when the State Personnel Board and the State Attorney General 
have interpreted the restriction as solely prohibiting ‘clearly partisan political activity.’  Id.  
The Board interpreted that “[The Act’s] reservation is subject to the prohibition that such 
persons may not take active part in political management or in political campaigns only.”  Id. 
at 618 n.15. 
65 Id.; see also  National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2177 (1998) 
(stating that “Any content-based considerations that may be taken into account in the grant-
making process are a consequence of the nature of arts funding.”).  If a grant is to be 
awarded, it is necessary to consider these factors to determine whether the art ist is entitled to 
the award.  Id. at 2178.  The government cannot fund all art or all groups that need funding.  
Id.  National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 100 F.3d 671, 685 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that 
since choices must be made, it is inherent that these choices will be made “with an eye to 
content.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment: When the Government Must Make 
Content-Based Choices, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 199, 205 (1994) (comparing the government 
funding artwork to a public library that will have to make content based choices concerning 
which books and magazines to buy because the funds and bookshelves are limited in 
quantity); see, e.g., Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 566 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(reviewing whether the city of Burbank could refuse performers Blue Oyster Cult, Todd 
Rundgren, and Jackson Browne from playing at the city auditorium); Brown v. Board of 
11
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2.  Unconstitutional Conditions 
 
Unconstitutional condition stands for the proposition that Congress cannot condition 
the granting of a benefit by asking the recipient to give-up a constitutional right.66  The 
doctrine expresses the view that an individual’s constitutional rights are absolute and 
non-negotiable.67  For instance, in Perry v. Sindermann,68 the Court explained that 
“even though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even 
though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are 
some reasons upon which the government may not rely.”69  That is, the government 
may not “deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally 
protected interests . . . .”70 
 
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has addressed whether NEA’s funding 
policies constitute unconstitutional conditions.71  The Court did not interpret the NEA’s 
guidelines for subsidizing art as a prohibition on the exercise of a fundamental right or a 
system to impose conditions on the exercise of First Amendment Constitutional rights.72 
 The Supreme Court found that the guidelines were a form of recognizing works that 
                                                                                                                         
Regents, 640 F. Supp. 674 (D. Neb. 1986) (considering whether it was permissible for the 
University of Nebraska to refuse to show in the movie “Hail Mary,” which depicted the birth 
of Christ in a contemporary setting); Chemerinsky, supra, at 205 (finding that content-based 
choices are sometimes inevitable in circumstances where the government must decide 
whether to allow a play or a concert based on content in a public forum).  
66 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1476-89 
(1989). 
67 Id. at 1478. 
68 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
69 Id. at 597; see also  Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (“The procedural device 
[at issue] must necessarily produce a result which the State could not command directly. . . . 
result[ing] in a deterrence of speech which the Constitution makes free.”); Elston, supra note 
7, at 345 (asserting some examples of situations where unconstitutional condition might 
occur).  For instance, a program granting medical benefits to recipients depending on whether 
they choose to give birth or have an abortion would present an unconstitutional condition.  
Id.  But cf.  Lyng v Int’l. Union, 485 U.S. 360, 364-65 (1988) ( finding that an unconstitutional 
condition did not exist when a program provides food stamps depending on whether union 
members were on strike or lost their jobs for other reasons). 
70 Perry, 408 U.S. at 597. 
71 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (finding a policy of not subsidizing the 
exercise of a fundamental right differs in an important respect from a prohibition on the 
exercise of a fundamental right); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980) (holding that the 
government may choose to subsidize medically necessary services and  not to subsidize 
abortions); Perry, 408 U.S. at 597 (holding that “[The government] may not deny a benefit to 
a person on a basis that infringes . . . [on the beneficiary’s] interest in freedom of speech.”).  
72 See, e.g., Boos, 485 U.S. at 312; Harris, 448 U.S. at 315. 
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otherwise would never have been recognized by the public.73  In addition, the Court 
found that when the NEA refuses an application, it does not prevent or prohibit the 
individual or organization from pursuing its artwork.74  Indeed, 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) 
adds “considerations” or factors to the grant-making process,75 it does not state that all 
grants should be denied to applications involving “indecent” or “disrespectful” art 
works.76  Also, 20 U.S.C. § 954 does not state how much weight the Advisory 
Commission, Council or Chairperson should give to this factor, only that the factor be 
taken into consideration.77   
 
In 1990, Congress created an Independent Commission of Constitutional Law 
Scholars to review the NEA’s grant making procedure.78  The Commission concluded 
that there is no constitutional obligation to provide arts funding, but recommended that 
the Chairperson exercise extreme caution when establishing procedures setting forth 
content restrictions.79 
 
Although the “decency and respect” provision is not a categorical determination of 
whether to grant funding, in those circumstances when it is a factor and the application 
                                                 
73 See, e.g., Boos, 485 U.S. at 312; Perry, 408 U.S. at 597; Harris, 448 U.S. at 315. 
74 National Endowment for the Arts, v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2179 (1998); see also Paul N. 
Rechenberg, Losing the Battle on Obscenity, But Can We Win the War? The National 
Endowment for the Arts’ Fight Against Funding Obscene Artistic Works, 57 MO. L. REV. 299, 
300 (1992) (stating that some artistic work which has gone beyond nudity has triggered such 
debate that artists are finding themselves defending their artistic works). 
75 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (1995) (“in establishing such regulations and procedures, the 
Chairperson shall ensure that – artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which 
applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect 
for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public . . . .”). 
76 But see, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380, 393 (1992) (invalidating the municipal 
ordinance that made it a criminal offense to place a symbol on public or private property 
“which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in 
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender”).  That provision disfavored 
specific subjects and suppressed “distinctive, idea[s], conveyed by a distinctive message.”  
Id. 
77 Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2175 (stating that the NEA implements the “decency and respect” 
provision by organizing an advisory panel which represents a wide variety of race and 
educational background, beliefs, and aesthetic views).  The Court found that [Finley] did not 
allege discrimination in any particular funding decision.  Id. at 2178.  “In fact, after filing suit 
to challenge § 954(d)(1), two of the individual respondents received NEA grants.”  Id. 
78 Independent Commission, Report to Congress on the National Endowment for the Arts 
83, 89, 3 Record, Doc. No. 151, Exh. K. (Sept. 1990) (recommending procedural changes to 
enhance the role of advisory panels and a statute which would affirm “the high place the 
nation accords to the fostering of mutual respect for the disparate beliefs and values among 
us”). 
79 Id. at 89. 
13
Choi: National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999
 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
is rejected, the applicant may claim unfairness and bias.80  Because 20 U.S.C. § 954 is a 
federal statute and it is binding on every state, the general standards of “decency and 
respect” will be measured with the beliefs and values of the general American public.81  
This presents a problem because it may be very difficult for a person from California to 
evaluate his work and consider whether it is respectful and decent for a person from 
Alaska.82  Even if the committee that recommends the art work is diverse enough to 
carry various perspectives, backgrounds, and appreciation for the arts, there will be 
problems.83 
 
B.  Tolerating Vagueness 
 
The Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford84 provided that vague statutes and 
regulations violate important values.85  First, the regulation will not provide an innocent 
individual appropriate warning as to unlawful or impermissible conduct.86  Second, 
because the courts enforce statutes or regulations, a regulation that is vague will have a 
discriminatory impact on innocent people.87  Third, a regulation that is vague will inhibit 
people from exercising their constitutional freedoms, such as freedom of expression.88 
 
The NEA plays a strong and influential role in the financial affairs of artistic funding 
in the United States.89  Most private funding sources believe that when NEA denies a 
                                                 
80 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1)(1995); see also  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973).  The 
Court determined whether the obscenity standards should be based upon community or 
national standards.  Id.  The Court was very concerned about applying national standards 
from one state to another because the Nation is so diverse in backgrounds that it would be 
too abstract to require a national formulation.  Id.  Each state should be viewed as an entity 
with its own communal personality and standards.  Id.  It would be unfair, vague, and 
unrealistic to apply the “personality and standards” from one state upon another.  Id.  The 
Court believed that enforcing a national standard would impose on the people of this Nation 
the heavy burden of trying to understand the standards of one state with respect to their 
own.  Id. 
81 Miller, 413 U.S. at 30. 
82 Miller, 413 U.S. at 33 (“[P]eople in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and 
this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity”). 
83 Id. 
84 408 U.S. 104 (1972).  
85 Id. at 108. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 108-09 “[A] vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to . . . 
[government officials] for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant 
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”). 
88 Id. (“[U]ncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful 
zone’ . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked”). 
89 Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 783 (1991) (“[B]ecause 
the NEA provides much of its support with conditions that require matching or co-funding 
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grant, it means that the artist’s work is deficient of artistic merit and value.90  Thus, 
once the NEA denies a grant to an applicant, the applicant may stand in a 
disadvantageous position in terms of attracting private funding sources. 91  Thus, it is 
very important that the NEA construe its standards of review as clearly and specifically 
as possible.92   
 
Indeed, the Supreme Court argued in Finley that because the nature of art is open to 
different interpretations, to ask Congress to enact precise guidelines for evaluating grant 
applications is literally impossible.93  As Chief Justice Warren stated, no individual could 
                                                                                                                         
from private sources, the NEA’s funding involvement in a project necessarily has a multiplier 
effect in the competitive market for funding of artistic endeavors”). 
90 National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2177-78 (1998) (explaining that 
as a result of the limited funds available to the NEA, even if the agency wished to grant all 
applications, it could not realistically do so); see, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 
(1991) (holding that Congress may fund some specific activities over others so long as it is in 
the public interest and it does not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint).  “In [choosing one 
activity over the other], the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it 
has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”  Id.  When the NEA 
turns down an application, it should not be viewed as blacklisting the denied applicants as 
artists with indecent or disrespectful work that is  unworthy of merit.  Id.  Just because 
universities grant scholarships to meritorious students does not mean that the student who 
was turned down is not likely to succeed or unworthy of recognition.  Id.  The NEA, just like 
universities, can only do so much and they should not be condemned as violating an 
applicant’s First Amendment rights when it denies an application.  Id. 
91 Bella Lewitzky Dance Found., 754 F. Supp. at 783.  In Bella, a nonprofit corporation 
applied for an NEA grant and brought an action challenging the constitutionality of requiring 
that grant recipients certify that funds awarded would not be used to promote or produce 
obscene material.  Id. at 773.  The applicants claimed that the vagueness of the certification 
forced grant recipients to avoid even “coming close to the line between what is merely 
provocative and what is proscribed.”  Id. at 782.  The applicant believed that many legitimate 
artistic projects would not be undertaken for fear of violating the vague terms of the 
certification.  Id.  The court found that “the creative expression of . . . [the applicant] would 
necessarily be tempered were [the applicant] to sign the certification and then take seriously 
[the applicant’s] pledge not to promote, disseminate or produce anything that the NEA in its 
judgment might find obscene.”  Id. at 783.  The court also stated that the chilling effect of the 
certification would be multiplied by the fact that the NEA occupies an influential role in the 
world of art.  Id.  “Most non-federal funding sources regard the NEA award as an imprimatur 
that signifies the recipient’s artistic merit and value.”  Id. 
92 Id. at 783. 
93 Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2179 (stating that because artists are in a country where different 
people of different backgrounds, ideas, and morals live, Congress must establish guidelines 
that are as clear and specific as possible to help artists understand their rights and limits.); see 
also  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 28 (1973) (finding that in order to create harmony and 
attention to the political and social opinions from the people, it is necessary to provide 
guidelines enabling people to know and understand their rights; each person’s rights end 
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require the government to choose between absolute freedom of expression or complete 
repression.94  The Supreme Court has consistently held that “lack of precision in 
[obscenity statutes] is not in itself offensive to the requirements of due process.”95  
Thus, the issue is whether the NEA’s “respect and decency” standard conveys 
sufficient warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common 
understanding and practices.96 
 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has also recognized that the regulation of speech or 
any form of expression carries an “inherent danger” of chilling speech.97  The statutes 
that regulate expression must be drafted carefully and specifically limited to regulate 
obscenity.98  Since literary and artistic work is a form of speech that is open to many 
different interpretations or points of view, it is important that the artist express his 
thoughts and emotions, keeping in mind how other people will view and react to this 
form of speech.99 
 
                                                                                                                         
where others begin). 
94 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964) (Warren C. J. dissenting) (“No government . . 
. should be forced to choose between repressing all material, including that within the realm of 
decency, and allowing unrestrained license to publish any material, no matter how vile .  There 
must be a rule of reason in this as in other areas of the law.”). 
95 Miller, 413 U.S. at 28; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1877) (“The Constitution 
does not require impossible standards . . . [All that is required is that] the language conveys 
sufficiently definite warnings as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common 
understanding and practices.”). 
96 Miller, 413 U.S. at 28.  
97 Miller, 413 U.S. at 18-19 (acknowledging that the States have a legitimate interest in 
controlling the dissemination of obscenity when the vehicle of dissemination will reach and 
offend the sensibilities of individuals such as children and juveniles). 
98 Id. at 25.  This case established basic guidelines for a trier of fact to determine whether a 
work of art is obscene:  
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards” 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) 
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a 
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Id.  This case extended the definition of obscenity to include those works which are “utterly” 
without social value, but which do not have “serious” value.  Id.  The case also presented 
several examples of materials which could be banned such as “patently offensive 
representations or descriptions of ultimate sex acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated 
and patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, 
and lewd exhibition of the genitals.”  Id. at 26-7.  
99 Id. at 27.  
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It is necessary to consider a “common sense” analysis for statutory interpretation.100 
 For instance, in Broadrick, et al. v. Oklahoma,101 the Oklahoma State Personnel Board 
charged state employees with actively participating in political activities in violation of 
the State Merit System Act.102  Although appellants acknowledged the benefits of this 
policy as it guaranteed the employee a work environment free from wrongful political 
impositions and extortion,103 they brought this action claiming that two paragraphs of 
the Act were invalid because of overbreadth and vagueness.104   
 
The Supreme Court found that those paragraphs gave adequate warning and “explicit 
standards” to the state employees.105  However, although the English language provides 
so many words to express ideas, the Court found that the Act was written in such a 
way that an ordinary individual using his ordinary common sense could sufficiently 
understand and comply with the provisions of the Act.106 
 
Balancing all arguments presented in this Note, artists have a legitimate concern that 
their views will be misinterpreted.107  Decency and respect vary from person to person 
and fall within a gray area, making it difficult for an artist to keep in mind these two 
factors when creating their work.108  When an educational institution promotes 
“excellence” by providing scholarships, there are factors that give an individual a good 
idea of what “excellence” means, such as academic performance, community services, 
personal experiences, and personal development.109  But when the government must use 
its discretion in determining what art it will fund, imposing upon artists a decency and 
respect criterion when evaluating their work is too vague and a heavy burden.110  Thus, 
                                                 
100 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 (1973). 
101 Id.  
102 Id.  Section 818, paragraph six, provided that “no classified service employee ‘shall 
directly or indirectly, solicit, receive, or in any manner be concerned in soliciting or receiving 
any assessment . . . or contribution for any political organization, candidacy or other political 
purpose.’ ”  Id. at 606.  The seventh paragraph provided that no service employee “shall 
belong to any national, state or local committee of a political party, or an officer or member of 
a committee of a partisan political club, or a candidate for nomination or election to any paid 
public office.”  Id. 
103 Id. at 606. 
104 Id. at 607. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Finley v. Nat’l. Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 680-83 (9th Cir. 1996). 
108 Id. 
109 See e.g., 2 U.S.C.§ 802 (1995) (establishing the Congressional Award Program to 
“promote initiative, achievement, and exc ellence among youths in the areas of public service, 
personal development, and physical and expedition fitness”); 20 U.S.C. § 1134h(a) (1995) 
(authorizing the Secretary of Education to award fellowships to “students of superior ability 
selected on the basis of demonstrated achievement and exceptional promise”). 
110 Sabrin, supra  note 60, at 1221 (stating that disqualifying art with specified offensive 
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in order to prevent the NEA from being a highly visible target of scrutiny, Congress 
should strike the decency and respect standard.111 
 
C.  Dissolving the NEA. 
 
As a result of the political attacks and budget cuts, the NEA once again has 
restructured its grant process.112  Under this new approach, the NEA is refraining from 
granting applications to individuals and instead is focusing on funding arts 
organizations.113  However, those who oppose the federal organization believe this 
approach is only rerouting the problem.114  The NEA’s approval and endorsement now 
will go to an art organization, which in turn will decide which individual projects will get 
the NEA funding.115  Thus, in the end, NEA grants will continue to negatively affect 
individual artists.116  
 
Recently, Congress has threatened to dissolve the NEA because it has failed to 
formulate an adequate framework on which the NEA may base their grant decisions.117 
 If the NEA is dissolved, there will be no more issues before the courts as to whether 
the NEA is violating an individual’s rights by holding moral beliefs within certain 
parameters the government finds appropriate.118  Also, artists will be able to express 
                                                                                                                         
viewpoints as artistically not meritorious will generate inconsistent outcomes because it is 
open to subjective interpretation).  “One mans’ vulgarity is another’s lyric.” Id. (citing Cohen 
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971)). 
111 Finley v. Nat’l. Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1475 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (stating 
“professional evaluations of artistic merit are permissible, but decisions based on the wholly 
subjective criterion of ‘decency’ are not”) aff’d, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 118 
S. Ct. 2168 (1997), rev’d, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998); Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 
560, 575-77 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that a city may dedicate a public forum to certain categories 
of expression but may not deny access to performers based on their political views or their 
unorthodox manner of expression). 
112 Priya Sara Cherian, Promoting the Arts by Dissolving the National Endowment for the 
Arts, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 129, 145 (1997). 
113 Deborah Bradley, Government Cuts Grants for Artists; NEA Official Tries to Explain 
How to Cope, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 23, 1996, at A29. 
114 Cherian, supra  note 112, at 145. 
115 Id. at 145-146 (stating that even if the NEA is dissolved, the government already has 
established incentive to those people who voluntarily help the arts by making their donations 
tax-deductible; thus, it is unnecessary and inadequate to force the American people to 
participate in art programs which they do not support). 
116 Id. at 146. 
117 Vetter & Roche, supra  note 46, at 17 (“As Congress trims the budget in keeping with 
the much publicized ‘Contract with America,’ the NEA could be abolished or its budget 
simply not reauthorized.”). 
118 Steven G. Gey, Is Moral Relativism a Constitutional Command?, 70 IND. L.J. 331, 331 
(1995) (stating that it is never appropriate for Congress to regulate a private individual’s 
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their thoughts and feelings through their artwork without congressional influence.119  It 
has been estimated that eliminating the NEA will save $170 million, or about 68 cents 
per citizen.120  Those who oppose the NEA assert that the government is affecting the 
art so much, that an artist whose application is rejected will have a much harder time 
getting funding.121   
 
However, eliminating the NEA will substantially reduce support to the arts.122  
Federal support of non-profit organizations and individuals involves financial support, 
prestige, and it attracts private entities to contribute to the art endorsement.123  Thus, 
removing the NEA will eliminate financial support from the federal government and 
private entities will lose motivation to further recognize promising arts.124  Although the 
percentage the NEA contributes to the total funding of a grantee is small, the benefits an 
organization receives through the exposure and the recognition by the federal 
government is outstanding.125  The federal government helps underrepresented artwork 
attract collateral funding from local and regional private sources.126 
 
D.  Possible Solutions 
 
Instead of dissolving the NEA, there are alternative avenues Congress should 
consider in reaching a resolution between the Constitution and the artist.127  First, the 
                                                                                                                         
beliefs and behavior if Congress’ primary motivation in enforcing the decency clause is to 
impose the moral beliefs of those in Congress). 
119 See id. 
120 Thomas P. Leff, The Arts: A Traditional Sphere of Free Expression? First Amendment 
Implications of Government Funding to the Arts in the Aftermath of Rust v. Sullivan, 45 AM. 
U. L. REV. 353, 404 (1995). 
121 Cherian, supra  note 112, at 146. 
122 Leff, supra  note 120, at 404 (stating that since 1978, NEA contributed approximately 
eleven percent of the total funding to non-profit organizations). 
123 Id. at 405. 
124 Id. at 404.  “Loss of federal funding would also reduce the diversification of non-
governmental fundraising by arts organizations and individuals.  It would remove the 
statutory compulsion to seek out matching grants because the prestige of federal support 
that attracts such private initiatives would be missing.”  Id.  
125 Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 783 (1991) (citing amicus 
brief of Theatre Communications Group which called NEA grant awards “critical to the ability 
of artists and companies to attract non-federal funding sources”). 
126 Leff, supra  note 120, at 404 (stating that since the NEA was founded in 1966 the number 
of art organizations helping the nation has increased over ten times). 
127 Cf., H.R.Rep. No. 618, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3186, 
3190.  “[T]he Foundation would serve not only to deepen our understanding of our friends 
and allies throughout the world, but would strengthen the projection of our Nation’s cultural 
life abroad and enable us better to overcome the increasing ‘cultural offensive’ being waged 
by Communist ideologies.”  Id. 
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Chairperson should document the specific purpose of the award and criteria that the 
committee members and she followed to reach the conclusion as to whether an 
application should be granted or denied.128  In this manner, if the grant is challenged, 
there will be sufficient evidence for a court to determine whether the NEA’s decision in 
any way violated the applicant’s Constitutional rights.129  This way, the committee and 
the Chairperson will be even more cautious in considering applications.130  The 
committee and the Chairperson will be more aware that their decision may be subject to 
review by a court.131  This will encourage them to pay attention to the “artistic merit” 
of the work.132  In the long run, artworks that truly have very little artistic value will not 
be funded, and the courts and Congress will have fewer reasons to challenge those 
decisions.133   
 
Second, the decency and respect provisions of the enabling statute should be 
repealed.134  Following the rationale from Miller and contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Finley, it is impossible to expect an artist to create artwork keeping in mind a 
“national community standard” of decency and respect.135  The NEA could focus only 
on the artistic excellence of the work.136  Based upon the artist’s detailed description of 
                                                 
128 Nancy Ravitz, A Proposal to Curb Congressional Interference with the National 
Endowment for the Arts, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475, 498, (1991) (adding to the 
requirement that “when applying for a grant, each applicant must provide to the NEA ‘a 
detailed description of the proposed project, production, workshop, or program for which the 
applicant requests assistance.’ ” ) (citing Dep’t of the Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-512, §103(g), 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS (104 Stat.) 1915, 1964). 
129 Ravitz, supra  note 128, at 498. 
130 Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1264, 1256 (4th Cir. 1974) (stating that an 
agency has a duty to state the principle and supporting rationale when explaining departure 
from prior inconsistent decisions). 
131 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 409 (1971) (“[T]he Court 
needed to review findings made prior to litigation to determine whether agency acted within 
the scope of delegated authority”). 
132 Ravitz, supra  note 128, at 499. 
133 Elizabeth E. DeGrazia, In Search of Artistic Excellence: Structural Reform of the 
National Endowment for the Arts, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 133, 178 (1994) (stating that 
creating a legitimate paper trail will provide the artist a better understanding of why he was 
denied funding and “would give the NEA grantmaking process the legitimacy that it currently 
does not have.”). 
134 Vetter, supra  note 46, at 16. 
135 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973). 
136 DeGrazia, supra  note 133, at 139 (stating that the review panel composed of art experts 
was a structural device which would guarantee artistic excellence isolating political 
influences). 
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the work, the committee members should use their expertise in the arts to resolve 
whether the artist is entitled to receive taxpayers’ money.137   
 
Third, the NEA should adopt an open door policy were applicants would have the 
opportunity to come before the committee members and advocate their work.138  The 
artists should be given the opportunity to be heard and express their reasons why their 
artwork is entitled to receive the committee’s vote.139  The advantage of this procedure 
is that the applicant will have less reason to believe that his artwork was misunderstood 
or misjudged.140  Critics to this option have expressed concern that the grants will be 
based upon the ability of the artist to be eloquent and savvy.141  However, in the legal 
arena, unless the attorney is savvy, eloquent, and witty, the client will stand little chance 
of winning.142  Indeed, arguments are a determinative factor in our judicial system, but 
it is not the only factor that determines whether the client will win or lose.143  For the 
same reason, this proposed option does not have to be the only determinative factor 
when approving an application.  This option could be implemented along with one or 
more of the options enumerated in this note.144 
 
Fourth, based upon the description submitted by the artist and their view and 
appreciation of the artwork, the committee members and Chairperson should ask: (1) 
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value,145 and (2) whether the public in general will most likely appreciate and 
understand the message the artist is trying to convey through his work.146  In Finley’s 
                                                 
137 Id. 
138 Lars Etzkorn, Balancing Art and Politics: The Use of Peer Panels in United States 
Government Funding the Arts, 9 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 323, 341 (1990) (stating that the 
Chairman of the NEA has expressed some concern as to having open panel deliberations 
because the applicants may pressure the panel or committee members to fund their artwork) 
(citing Gamarekian, Endowment Nominee Making Rounds in Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 
1989, at B17, col. 1 (national ed.)). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. (“If the NEA adopted an open door policy an element of politics would be 
introduced as grant applicants would be better able to lobby for their applications.”). 
142 Paul L. Gardner, Appeal of a Patent Case to the Federal Circuit, in PATENT LITIGATION 
1990, at 491, 508 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course 
Handbook Series No. G4-3858, 1990). 
143 Id. 
144 See supra  notes 127-38 and accompanying text. 
145 20 U.S.C. § 954(a)(2)(1995) (stating that the Act sought to create a climate encouraging 
freedom of thought, imagination, and conditions facilitating the release of creative talent). 
146 20 U.S.C. § 951(8)(1995) (“The world leadership which has come to the United States 
cannot rest solely upon superior power, wealth, and technology, but must be solidly founded 
upon worldwide respect and admiration for the Nation’s high qualities as a leader in the realm 
of ideas and of the spirit.”). 
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case, she never supported why her work was worthy of artistic excellence.147  It is 
uncertain whether the public would understand that her monologue in which she coated 
her bare breasts with chocolate, was meant to symbolize the oppression of women.148  
In short, these options will help the applicant understand the basis upon which the NEA 
will make its funding.149 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Art is the only means many people find that truly expresses their feelings, 
worries, and thoughts.150  The “decency and respect” provision that the Supreme Court 
upheld in Finley is not appropriate in federal funding.151  Even if the “decency and 
respect” provision is only a factor that the NEA may consider when determining who is 
entitled to receive a grant, it is very likely that it will hamper viewpoints which might be 
misunderstood.152  It is impossible to apply a national contemporary standard of 
decency and respect.153  Moral values are very different from state to state and it is 
wrong to impose values from one state upon the other.154  Thus, Congress should 
repeal the “decency and respect” provision and consider artwork for its artistic 
excellence alone.155   
 
Factors that may help reduce the amount of speculation, litigation, and censorship 
against the NEA are: (1) create a paper trail where applicants will understand why their 
artwork is not being funded;156 (2) establish an open door policy where the artists will 
have an opportunity to explain why their work is entitled to receive tax-payers’ 
money;157 (3) consider whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value;158 and (4) consider whether the public in general 
will most likely appreciate and understand the message the artist is trying to convey 
                                                 
147 National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2175 (1998). 
148 Id. 
149 Chemerinsky, supra  note 65, at 212 (stating that the NEA must have explicit criteria 
which will minimize the possibility that the government will be using its authority to suppress 
unpopular messages). 
150 Walker, supra  note 1, at 955. 
151 Finley v. Nat’l. Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1468-72 (C.D. Cal. 1992), 
aff’d, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), cert granted, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1997), rev’d, 118 S. Ct. 2168 
(1998). 
152 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1468-72. 
156 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
157 DeGrazia, supra  note 133, at 139 and accompanying text. 
158 20 U.S.C. § 951(2) (1995). 
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through his work.159  Repealing the “decency and respect” clause and implementing 
these factors will be the best solution for artists and the NEA.  
 
Alicia M. Choi 
                                                 
159 20 U.S.C. § 951(8) (1995). 
23
Choi: National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999
